Book Cover
Brian L. Davies, The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2016, pp. 328, £ 25,99.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 shaped in an irreversible way the history of the Black Sea, of the Balkans and of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The book by Brian L. Davies, Professor of History at the University of Texas at San Antonio, tracks back the phases which led to the conflict, as well as the short and medium-long term consequences that it produced.
The author uses a vast and updated bibliography to shed light not only on the most pivotal moments of the war, but especially on the diplomatic manoeuvres behind it. As the title reveals, the perspective that Davies picks is the one of the court of Saint Petersburg, of which he is a specialist and on which he published several papers.
The work opens with Catherine II who, after overthrowing her husband Peter III in 1762, had to deal with several political and diplomatic issues, among which the most difficult was the one linked to the bordering Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This polity was lacerated by internecine squabbles among several noble clans, which were fighting to place their candidate on the soon to be vacant Polish throne, due to the weak health conditions of Augustus III.
This internal weakness allowed strong foreign influences and made the Commonwealth an ideal prey not only for the Central-Eastern European states, such as Prussia, Austria and Russia, but also a potential counterweight or buffer state in the area for France and the Ottoman Empire. The Russians eventually managed to see their candidate rise to the Polish throne, as Stanisław Poniatowski was elected by the Sejm in 1764. Poniatowski was one of the favourites of Catherine II and he was also member of the Familja, an affluent and pro-Russian Polish noble faction.
France had desperately tried to hamper Saint Petersburg through his ambassador to Constantinople, who was tasked to press the Ottoman Empire to declare war over Russia, demonstrating that a Russian growth could seriously jeopardise and further destabilise the always restless borders of the Ottoman domains on the Black Sea and of their Tatar vassals.
Mustafa III feared the Russians also for the increasing presence of their agents in the Balkans and Danubian Principalities, who instigated the Orthodox population to rebel. When the portion of the Szlachta (Polish noble class) against Poniatowski had gathered and rebelled in the Confederation of Bar, with the final aim to expel the Russians, the Porte and the French backed this initiative with financial and military assistance. Nonetheless, after the incident of Balta, Mustafa III imprisoned in the Prison of the Seven Towers the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Obreskov, declaring war over Russia in October 1768.
Davies highlights several interesting factors of this conflict, that allow the reader to understand the scenario where the facts unfolded. Firstly, he stresses the fact that the clash between the Russian and the Ottoman Empire was one between two “very different political systems with different strengths and limitations in mobilizing and managing resources for war”(p. 243)”. This is an accurate point which is also corroborated by an overview of the decentralisation and centralisation processes that touched respectively the Ottoman and Russian administrations.
These two empires are also put in relation with the difficult situation of their frontiers north of the Black Sea, where frequent raids and tensions between Tatars and Cossacks complicated the relationship between Istanbul and Saint Petersburg, which already in the past had offered the pretext to hit each other. Russian fiscal, institutional and military reforms are also sifted by the author, as they produced a more solid and pugnacious army that earned the respect of their European counterparts as the victories of Peter the Great and especially the Sever Years’ War demonstrated. These changes radically influenced even the evolution of the war of 1768-74.
After an hesitant beginning, the Russians overwhelmed the Ottomans in 1770, taking their fortresses on the river Dniester and penetrated into the Danubian Principalities winning several battles even against numerically superior enemies. These operations were also facilitated by an effective diversion carried out by the Russian Navy that, with the assistance of the British, sailed from the Baltic Sea towards the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
Led by Aleksei Orlov, brother of Catherine’s favourite Grygorij, the Russian fleet dominated the war theatre and delivered a heavy blow to the Ottomans through the battle of Çeşme, which led to the following – though half-hearted – blockade of Istanbul. Davies sheds light even on the operations of intelligence that Saint Petersburg carried out to stir up the Balkan Orthodox, thanks to the promises of Catherine who “offered herself as protector of the Greek rite”(p. 152).
Commemorative medal of the Battle of Çeşme. Obverse: Half length figure of Admiral Count Orlov, right, head facing, wearing helmet with plumes and imperial eagle in front, ribbon of St. Andrew over right shoulder, baton in extended right hand. Reverse: map of the theatre of war with the positions of the fleets. By Johan Balthasar Gass, 1770. Silver medal. The British Museum, Department of Coins and Medals. London.
The American scholar easily unfolds the several phases of this complex conflict and manages to give the right space to all the five fronts where the armies of the two empires fought. Besides Poland, the Danubian Principalities and Eastern Mediterranean, the clashes involved Crimea and Caucasus as well, where the Russians laid the foundations for the future annexations of Crimea and Georgia, and for the difficult relationship with the Chechens.
1771 was far to be a less decisive year. After securing the fortresses on the North bank of the Danube, Russian forces strengthened their positions and seized Crimea, while in the Eastern Mediterranean Orlov’s men, also thanks to the support of the rebel pasha of Egypt Alì Bey, attacked several Middle Eastern cities, among them Beirut which was even occupied in 1774. 1771 was also the year when the Russian definitively closed the Polish front, by defeating the Confederation of Bar. The occupation of the Danubian Principalities and the Russian increasing presence in the Balkans alarmed Austria, which feared the Russian intrusion in areas where Vienna had placed her sight since long time. The cumbersome presence of Russia in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also raised the concerns of Prussia. This eventually led to the First Partition of Poland, by which Catherine II gained that essential tranquillity to continue her military operations against the Ottomans.
Despite these results, the war began to be financially burdensome also for Russia, due to its huge costs. Taking into account the state revenues for the period 1768-1771, Davies claims that “a little under half of this expenditures had gone to the conduct of the war with the Porte”(p. 189). The death toll was another important problem. The Russians had not lost many men in action, but the spread of diseases and cold Winters demoralised the troops. One of the most frequent causes of death was the plague, which following the supply chain spread up to Moscow and even reached the gates of Saint Petersburg.
These difficulties, along with the need to suppress the Pugacev’s rebellion in the Russian territories, pressed Catherine to begin peace negotiations. These only succeeded after further wearing the Ottoman army out, and after crossing the Danube again and occupying the some fortresses on the southern bank of the river. After some rebuttals by the Sublime Porte, the parties finally signed the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on the 5th of July 1774, which ended the hostilities and redesigned the future maps of the Black Sea and the Russian presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
The treaty led to numerous changes, to which Davies devotes the whole final chapter. Firstly, the independence of the Crimean Khanate which was established by the peace, soon ended up with the Russian occupation of the region in 1783. Another important consequence was the Russian colonisation of the northern bank of the Black Sea, which was entrusted to the ambitious direction of Grigoryi Potyomkin, new favourite of Catherine and rising star of the Russian politics of the time, as well as among the supporters of the “Greek Project” aimed at expelling the Ottomans from Istanbul and replace them with pro-Russian government.
The war and Pugachev’s rebellion also highlighted the need to assert a stronger control over Russian periphery, which in turn sparked the administrative reform carried out by Catherine with the aim to centralise and even out the status of several provinces of the Empire. Another important consequence was the question of the “protection” of the Orthodox subjects in the Empire of the Grand Seignior. Davies specifies that the treaty only mentioned the commitment of the Ottoman Empire to guarantee the freedom of worship for the Orthodox subjects, whilst Russia had the right to express her grievance only for a church “constructed at Constantinople”(p. 208).
The author also details that the Russian interpretation extended this article also to a right of protection of the Orthodox, whilst the Ottoman version meant more the conservation of the Orthodox religion. The Sublime Porte had to listen with attention to potential Russian complaints, but eventually the Sultan was the one to exert the protection. This divergence was to be used in the coming future by Saint Petersburg to interfere with the Ottoman internal affairs.
Moreover, the same fomentation of the Greeks and of the Balkan Orthodox during the course of this long conflict is believed to be at the base of the following requests of autonomy and of the Serbian and Greek wars of independence.
Despite the complexity of the subjects analysed by Davies, the volume manages to offer to the reader a clear and detailed picture of this portion of Eastern Europe at the end of the Ancien Régime. The analysis of the factions/parties at the court of Saint Petersburg, as well as of the way by which Catherine managed to keep a balance among them and master the decisional processes, is remarkable. It is also noteworthy the considerations about the aftermath of the long war, which open new perspectives of research and encourage the reader towards a more detailed investigation of the following developments.
Credits: “Allegory of Catherine the Great’s victory over the Turks”. Oil on canvas, by Stefano Torelli, 1772. State Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow.
The painting glorifies the victories of the Russian army in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74. Catherine sits, as the goddes Minerva, on a triumphal chariot surrounded by allegorical images of the grateful populations who inhabited the southern frontier of the Russian Empire. Winged creatures soar in the sky and trumpet her glory, and they crown her with a laurel wreath. Catherine is accompanied by some main figures of the Russian army who received the Order of Saint George: Pyotr A. Rumyantsev, Aleksei G. Orlov, Pyotr I. Panin, Vladimir M. Dolgoruky, Nikolai V. Repnin, Fyodor G. Orlov. The procession is headed by Grygoryi G. Orlov, the favourite of the empress and one of the main engineers of the war operations. Orlov is depicted in front of Catherine’s chariot with a diamond portrait of the empress on his chest.
